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Our society faces major challenges in numerous areas, including climate change 
and healthcare. Addressing these problems with technological advances are of great 
importance. Increasingly, however, consumers are resisting or rejecting such 
technological interventions based on inappropriate assignment of risk. In other words, the 
consumer assessment of risk is not in line with evidence-based assessment of risk. This 
 
* Joanna Sax is the E. Donald Shapiro Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, San Diego, CA. The 
author is grateful to Timothy Lytton, Sarah Morath, Michael Roberts, Stephanie Tai, Diana Winters, and 
participants at the 2019 Annual Academy of Food Law & Policy Conference for their helpful comments. 
40 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:39 
article focuses on two controversial areas, vaccines and genetically engineered food, as 
examples in which consumers assign a high risk despite an evidence-based assessment of 
low risk. This article describes how empirically tested decision-making theories explain 
why consumers inappropriately assign risk. While these prevailing theories and strategies 
are meritorious, this article suggests that changes in modern day society need to be 
considered as variables in how consumers assign risk. This is a tough problem to solve 
and current risk communication strategies appear insufficient. This leads to the central 
issue addressed in this article, which is that risk communication/policy implementation 
needs to address emergent variables in modern society, including (1) rise of hyper 
individualism, (2) role of the internet, and (3) economic interests. After discussing how 
these variables likely apply to consumer risk assessment, this article proposes an 
important new direction, both normatively and empirically, to highlight the problem and 
analyze consumer decision-making.  
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines, critiques, and reconciles multiple decision-making theories as 
they help us understand a disconnect between consumer perceptions of risk and evidence-
based assessment of risk in biotechnology. It is not just that consumers do not behave as 
expected by the incentives created by policies, which we already know is a problem. The 
problem is two-fold: (1) people inappropriately assign risk regardless of the presentation 
of evidence-based assessment of risk; and (2) people seek policies (and attendant behavior) 
that support their assessment of risk, even when that assessment of risk is wrong. One 
example of this is seen with vaccines. As it applies to the first fold, people decide not to 
vaccinate even though the evidence-based assessment of risk supports vaccination. As it 
applies to the second fold, people are seeking exemptions to vaccination laws. Another 
example of this is seen with genetically engineered food (colloquially called GMOs ). 
As it applies to the first fold, people believe that GMOs are unsafe, even though the 
evidence-based assessment of risk establishes that GMOs are safe. As it applies to the 
second fold, people seek labeling of foods and stricter regulation. This article seeks to 
understand the influences that create these problems and proposes approaches to allow 
consumers to appropriately assign risk as part of their decision-making processes. 
Opponents to vaccines and GMOs utilize decision-making theories in a way that 
does not allow consumers to appropriately assign risk. To date, experts agree on one 
thing we have not done enough to combat the spread of mis-information.1 Or, at least, 
we have not reached consumers in a way that allows them to determine which information 
is accurate and which information is not. This article suggests that simply providing correct 
information is not enough. This issue is a tough problem to solve. This article suggests 
what may be viewed as radical departures from the norm; the norm being that we provide 
accurate information and hope that people make informed and rational decisions. This 
article proposes that additional steps need to be taken, including, but not limited to, 
exposing the entities that spread misinformation for what they are doing they are 
 
 1. See, e.g., L.Z.G. Touyz, Genetically Modified Foods, Cancer, and Diet: Myths and Reality, 20 CURR. 
ONCOL. e59, e59 (2013); Tara C. Smith, Vaccine Rejection and Hesitancy: A Review and Call to Action, 4 OPEN 
F. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1, 1 2 (2017). 
2020] THE PROBLEMS WITH DECISION-MAKING 41 
manipulating the way we understand how people make decisions. In addition, accurate 
information can be communicated in a way that recognizes how people make decisions. 
This, in and of itself, is manipulative, to be sure, which is why it should be studied and 
assessed before any implementation.  
Decision-making is complicated and many theories exist to explain this complex 
process. This article focuses on a specific set of theories that are discussed and utilized in 
the legal literature. These are: (1) ambiguity aversion; (2) affect; (3) cultural cognition; 
and (4) dual process/heuristics.2 This is not an exhaustive list and is not intended to 
discount or ignore other decision-making theories. It is simply not possible to address 
every decision-making theory, nor is it needed. To the extent that this article attempts to 
reconcile how multiple decision-making theories can be applicable to addressing the 
problem in which people inappropriately assign risk, the same tools can be used to extend 
to and incorporate other theories as well. This article is a beginning, not an end. The 
purpose is to launch a cohesive and collaborate platform that is subject to vetting, change, 
and progress.  
The decision-making theories addressed in this article have empirical support that 
can be utilized in assessing how these theories are used to explain a disconnect between 
consumer perceptions and evidence-based assessment of risk in certain policies. This 
article discusses some current roadblocks, or at least heavy bumps in the road, that help 
explain why people might inappropriately assign risk. These variables are (1) the rise of 
individualism; (2) misinformation on the internet; and (3) economic forces seeking to 
undermine the application of biotechnology. These variables demonstrate the problems 
with decision-making. Or, perhaps, more accurately, support the large body of decision-
making research that demonstrates that people do not behave rationally. The theories 
discussed within this article are robust and can withstand the challenge of these variables. 
The larger issue addressed in this article is how to address these variables in a way that 
allows people to make decisions in which their assessment of risk is in line with evidence-
based assessment of risk. This does not determine the actual decision that people will 
make, for example, eat food from GMOs, but it allows them to appropriately assign risk 
to food from GMOs (i.e., they are safe) when making food choices. With a correct 
assessment of risk, the person may still choose to eat non-GMOs. In other words, this 
article is concerned with risk assessment and perception, not necessarily the final decision. 
While this article limits the discussion of controversial examples to vaccines and 
GMOs, the concepts are applicable to other controversial areas such as dietary 
supplements, fluoridated water, and other areas of scientific inquiry and exploration. 
Something more is happening than mistrust of scientists or industry something much 
more fundamental is happening. This article seeks to explore a much more complicated 
underbelly of this social phenomenon and attempts to expose and discuss a much more 
complicated array of decision-making currents that ultimately need to be explicitly 
 
 2. Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 657 (1961); Paul Slovic, 
What s Fear Got to Do With It? It s Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 MISS. L. REV. 971, 971 (2004); Dan M. 
Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY 726, 
726 28 (S. Roeser et al. eds., 2012) [(hereinafter Kahan (2012)]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
42 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:39 
addressed.  
Part I of this article describes four major decision-making theories: (1) ambiguity 
aversion; (2) affect; (3) cultural cognition; and (4) dual process/heuristics. This section is 
necessarily descriptive. A large body of research supports these theories both 
normatively and empirically. Part II highlights some tools for policy implementation that 
recognize how people make decisions. These tools use tactics to push people to make the 
decision that the policy seeks to accomplish. The examples discussed in this article are (1) 
nudging; (2) public participation through notice and comment, and (3) risk communication 
and risk perception. Part III describes two controversial areas of biotechnology, vaccines 
and GMOs, as examples of how the decision-making theories help to explain why some 
people inappropriately assign risk. These examples are chosen because both vaccines and 
GMOs have an evidence-based assessment of low risk, but sectors of the public 
inappropriately assign a high risk. Part IV describes how three important variables: rise of 
individualism, misinformation on the internet, and economics, need to be considered as 
disrupting the ability for people to make decisions in which they appropriately assign risk. 
This article addresses how these variables actually speak to the very way that people make 
decisions and manipulate people into inappropriately assigning risk. This article concludes 
with thoughts about how to apply what we know from decision-making theories and risk 
perception to provide information in a way that allows people to make an assessment of 
risk that is in line with evidence-based assessment of risk. 
I. DECISION-MAKING THEORIES 
By decision-making theories, this article refers to thinking processes that impact risk 
perception.3 This is distinct from motivations or challenging so-called rational norms. 
While numerous thinking theories exist, this article focuses on a subset that either are 
regularly referred to in the legal literature, discussed in the social science literature with 
reference to policy, or both. With these criteria, this article focuses on ambiguity, affect, 
cultural cognition, dual process/availability heuristics all of which are empirically tested 
to impact risk perception. Of note, these theories will be discussed separately from tools 
for policy implementation, infra Part II, such as nudging and risk communication. This 
section is necessarily descriptive of the theories; an application of these theories to 
vaccines and GMOs will be discussed in Part III. 
A. Ambiguity Aversion 
Daniel Ellsberg s seminal work on ambiguity aversion provides insights that people 
prefer options with known risks even if another option exists that is likely less risky, but 
the subject is not familiar with the unknown risk.4 In his work, Ellsberg demonstrated that 
 
 3. Decision-making is complicated. Some theories address motivations, while other theories help us 
understand the thinking process especially as it relates to risk assessments. See, e.g., How we change what others 
think, feel, believe, and do, CHANGING MINDS (last visited Jan. 22, 2020), 
http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/a_decision.htm (listing and linking to a variety of decision-
making theories and separating them into different categories). 
 4. Ellsberg, supra note 2, at 657 ( Responses from confessed violators indicate that the difference is not to 
be found in terms of the two factors commonly used to determine a choice situation, the relative desirability of 
the possible pay-offs and the relative likelihood of the events affecting them, but a third dimension of the problem 
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given a choice between betting on an urn with a known ratio of red and black marbles 
compared to betting on an urn with an unknown ratio, subjects preferred to bet on the urn 
with the known ratio.5 Additional work elucidated this theory and helped us to understand 
how ambiguity aversion underscores a person s perception of risk.6 The underlying 
thinking process is that a person has a hard time assigning risk when an unknown variable 
is presented, thus they revert to a known risk, even if that risk is higher. 
Later studies demonstrate that ambiguity aversion underscores additional risk 
perception problems. When people are presented with ambiguous information, they have 
trouble sorting through the likely risk assessment and are inclined to assign a high risk and 
low benefit, even in the face of evidence that the risk is low and the benefit is high.7 A 
salient example, discussed further below, is vaccine hesitant parents ( VHPs ).8 When 
presented with information regarding risks from vaccines, even if the risk is not evidence-
based (e.g., link to autism) and also with information that no risk of autism exists, the 
parent may assign a high risk and decide not to vaccinate. The information about a link of 
vaccines with autism clearly comes from an unreliable source, but the parent is unable to 
discount that information. They receive ambiguous information, believe that their child is 
at a possible future risk for autism, and decide not to vaccinate. The parent has 
inappropriately assigned a high risk to a side effect that does not even exist and assigned 
a low benefit to the prevention of the vaccine preventable disease, e.g., measles.9 This 
 
of choice: the nature of one s information concerning the relative likelihood of events. What is at issue might be 
called the ambiguity of this information, a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability, and unanimity  of 
information, and giving rise to one s degree of confidence  in an estimate of relative likelihoods. ). 
 5. Ambiguity aversion helps us understand why people will choose the option with a known higher risk, 
even if the other option likely has a lower risk. It is the unknown that creates the aversion, even when the unknown 
is likely less risky. Id. at 656. 
 6. Id. at 658 62, 666 ( In contrast, the ambiguities surrounding the outcome of a proposed innovation, a 
departure from current strategy, may be more noticeable. Different sorts of events are relevant to its outcome, 
and their likelihoods must now be estimated, often with little evidence or prior expertise; and the effect of a given 
state of nature upon the outcome of the new action may itself be in question. Its variance may not appear any 
higher than that of the familiar action when computed on the basis of best estimates  of the probabilities 
involved, yet the meaningfulness of this calculation may be subject to doubt. The decision rule discussed will 
not preclude choosing such an act, but it will definitely bias the choice away from such ambiguous ventures and 
toward the strategy with known risks. ); Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling 
Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 333 41 (1992) (describing empirical 
studies of ambiguity). One study provided scenarios in which a new form of technology, likely with a lower risk, 
was provided as an option compared to a known, likely higher, risk. Participants who indicated aversion to 
ambiguous information as assessed by their responses to predictor questions also demonstrated an aversion to 
choosing a new technology, even if the risk was communicated as lower. Joanna K. Sax & Neal Doran, Ambiguity 
and Consumer Perceptions of Risk in Various Areas of Biotechnology, 42 J. CONSUM. POL Y 47, 54 56 (2019) 
[hereinafter Sax & Doran (2019)]. 
 7. See Camerer & Weber, supra note 6, at 325 33 (discussing modeling uncertainty and ambiguity); Sax & 
Doran (2019), supra note 6, at 55 57 ( As hypothesized, we found that participants who showed an initial 
aversion to ambiguous information were significantly more likely to choose the response options that indicated 
a high assessment of risk, even when alternative choices had a high benefit or a likelihood of low risk. ). 
 8. Laura L. Blaisdell, Caitlin Gutheil, Norbert A. M. Hootsmans & Paul K. J. Han, Unknown Risks: Parental 
Hesitation about Vaccination, 36 MED. DECISION MAKING 479, 480 (2016) ( Whether perceptions of and 
aversion to ambiguity might play a role in vaccine hesitancy is an important question given the vast amount of 
vaccine-related information to which parents are exposed and which is often incomplete, conflicting, and 
changing. ). 
 9. See id. at 482 ( Parents in the groups also minimized the subjective risk of harms from [vaccine 
preventable diseases] by citing various factors that they believed reduced these risks. ). 
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assignment of high risk and low benefit is completely at odds with the scientific 
assessment which is low risk and high benefit for vaccines.  
In sum, ambiguity aversion helps explain how a person makes a decision to assign a 
high risk when they receive competing information.10 The aversion to the ambiguous 
information means that they will assign a high risk even if some of the information 
presented establishes an evidence-based low risk. Any information that creates ambiguity, 
even if it is a small amount of information, impacts how the person perceives risk.  
B. Affect Heuristics 
Paul Slovic s work on the decision-making theory called affect heuristics helps us 
to understand how a faint whisper of emotion underscores a person s perception of risk.11 
For example, the feeling of dread associated with the consequences of the malfunction of 
a nuclear power plant underscores a person s assessment that nuclear power is high risk 
and low benefit.12 However, risk assessment supports that nuclear power is clean and safe, 
or, in risk perception terms, nuclear power is low risk and high benefit13 The probability 
of a meltdown of a nuclear power plant is extremely low. The risks from regular use of 
coal energy are high. But, the mental visual of people melting or dying of cancer from a 
nuclear power plant breakdown is simply too much emotion for people to decide that 
nuclear power is low risk and high benefit.14 This is compounded, of course, by actual 
meltdowns of nuclear power plants such as Chernobyl and Fukushima.15  
Work by Slovic and others demonstrates that negative words or feelings impact 
 
 10. Ellsberg, supra note 2, at 657. 
 11. Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 322, 
322 (2006) (comparing strong emotions, such as fear and anger, with subtler feelings: Fortunately, most of the 
time people are in a calmer state, being guided by much subtler feelings. We shall focus this review on a faint 
whisper of emotion  called affect. We use the term affect to mean the specific quality of goodness  or badness  
(a) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (b) demarcating a positive or negative 
quality of a stimulus. We have used the term the affect heuristic  to characterize reliance on such feelings. ); 
Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, 177 EUR. J. 
OPERATIONAL RES. 1333, 1333 35 (2007). 
 12. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 285 (1987) [hereinafter Slovic (1987)]; Slovic & Peters, 
supra note 11, at 322 23 ( Those studies showed that feelings of dread were the major determiner of public 
perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards. This explained, for example, why the public judges 
radiation exposure from nuclear power plants (highly dreaded) as far riskier than radiation from medical X-
rays an assessment not shared by risk experts. In today s world, terrorism has replaced nuclear power at the top 
of the list of widely dreaded risks. ); see also Joanna K. Sax, Biotechnology and Consumer Decision-Making 47 
SETON HALL L. REV. 433, 437 fn. 6 (2017) [hereinafter Sax (2017)]; Slovic, supra note 2, at 977 78. 
 13. Slovic (1987), supra note 12, at 281; see also Michael Siegrist & Bernadette Sutterlin, Human and 
Nature-Caused Hazards: The Affect Heuristic Causes Biased Decisions, 34 RISK ANALYSIS 1482, 1482 92 
(2014) (comparing participants  assessment of risk in human-made and natural disasters, using nuclear power as 
an example of human-made hazard). 
 14. See Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 322 ( fear amplifies risk estimates ); Slovic (1987), supra note 12, 
at 283, 285 ( Factor 1, labeled dread risk  is defined at its high (right-hand) end by perceived lack of control, 
dread, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits. Nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power score highest on the characteristics that make up this factor. ); Siegrist & Sutterlin, 
supra note 13, at 1483, 1488 89. 
 15. Interestingly, the accident at Three Mile Island, another example of a problem at a nuclear power plant, 
did not result in a single direct fatality or a higher percentage of latent cancer fatalities, but the accident itself 
caused serious externalities in perceptions of risk. Slovic (1987), supra note 12, at 283. 
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consumer risk assessment.16 If consumers feel that the use of a new technology may cause 
cancer, such as the misinformation provided about eating food from GMOs, then the 
person rejects such technology and assigns a high risk and low benefit. The feeling or 
affect overwhelms the ability to accept the evidence-based assessment of low risk and high 
benefit.17 Not surprisingly, those skilled in marketing take advantage of the affect heuristic 
to sway consumer confidence.  
Positive feelings also impact consumer decision-making.18 If home shoppers see a 
home that makes them feel positive, they might be more likely to buy it. Furthermore, 
consumers want to re-experience positive feelings. So, when shopping for clothes or other 
items, a positive feeling might sway consumers to make purchases. These positive feelings 
also underscore consumer risk perception. If consumers have a positive affect, they tend 
to assign a low risk and high benefit, regardless of evidence-based risk assessment.19  
Additional studies utilize the theory of affect heuristics to understand implicit 
assessments.20 In these studies, subjects are asked how they associate positive or negative 
words with a particular subject.21 The positive or negative associations demonstrate 
underlying or implicit responses even when an explicit response might be different. For 
example, a subject may think they are woke  and would not discriminate, but their 
implicit assessment suggests otherwise. This important work demonstrates that we can 
socialize people to make non-discriminatory choices, even if they have implicit negative 
associations. 
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, Paul Slovic and others, collaborate with other 
scholars to harmonize or suggest ways in which the affect heuristic and other decision-
making theories are at play in consumer responses to policy and to policy decisions in and 
 
 16. See Ellen Peters, Daniel Vastfjall, Tommy Garling & Paul Slovic, Affect and Decision Making: A Hot  
Topic, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 79, 81 82 (2006) [hereinafter Peters (2006)]. 
 17. Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 323 (describing work by Alhakami and Slovic in which they found an 
inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit, in other words, that people assign a low benefit 
to a perceived high risk. This finding implies that people judge a risk not only by what they think about it but 
also by how they feel about it. If their feelings toward an activity are favorable, they tend to judge the risks as 
low and the benefits as high; if their feelings toward the activity are unfavorable, they tend to make the opposite 
judgment-high risk and low benefit (i.e. the affect heuristic [internal citation omitted]. ). 
 18. Peters (2006), supra note 16, at 80 ( First, affect can act as information: at the moment of judgment or 
choice, decision makers consult their feelings about a choice and ask, How do I feel about this? The feelings 
act as information to guide the judgment or decision processes.  [internal citations omitted]); Slovic & Peters, 
supra note 11, at 322 ( Pleasant feelings motivate actions that people anticipate will reproduce those feelings. 
Unpleasant feelings motivate actions that people anticipate will avoid those feelings. ). 
 19. Peters (2006), supra note 16, at 82 ( In four studies, [Caruso and Shafir] show that thoughts about mood, 
regardless of its valence, increases choices of alternatives that promote a good mood, even if those options would 
have been rejected otherwise (when not thinking about mood). ). 
 20. Michael Siegrist, Carmen Keller & Marie-Eve Cousin, Implicit Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power and 
Mobile Phone Base Stations: Support for the Affect Heuristic, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 1021, 1023 25 (2006) 
(studying implicit attitudes toward nuclear power). 
 21. See, e.g., Michael Siegrist, Carmen Keller & Marie-Eve Cousin, Implicit Attitudes Toward Nuclear 
Power and Mobile Phone Base Stations: Support for the Affect Heuristic, 26 RISK ANALYSIS 1021, 1023 25 
(2006) (assessing whether negative attributes are more strongly associated with nuclear power and that positive 
attributes are more strongly associated with hydroelectric power. ); see also Alexa Spence & Ellen Townsend, 
Implicit Attitudes towards Genetically Modified (GM) Foods: A Comparison of Context-Free and Context-
Dependent Evaluations, 46 APPETITE 67, 67 (2006) (using the Go No-Go task to investigate explicit and implicit 
attitudes toward foods from GMOs). 
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of themselves.22 This underscores an important point of this article, which is that multiple 
decision-making processes are at work at the same time even the experts know this. 
Allowing consumers to appropriately assign risk requires a holistic approach to addressing 
consumer decision-making.  
C. Cultural Cognition 
Cultural cognition, with a large amount of work led by Dan Kahan, theorizes that 
group values impacts risk perception.23 Put differently, the cultural outlook of a group, 
including the culture s world view, impacts the risk perception of the individuals within 
that group.24 Cultural theory, the underlying theoretical framework posits two basic 
claims: (1) if a participant in a group engages in conduct that is perceived as a harm to the 
collective group, that participant will face censure or blame, and (2) participants in a group 
perceive risk in a way that advances the way of life to which they participate.25 
The cultures to which cultural cognition refer to are not the layman cultures, such as 
European, Korean, Jewish, etc. Rather, they group or grid based on philosophical 
categories, such as individualism, hierarchy, communitarianism, and egalitarianism.26 
This allows researchers to test the role of philosophy/culture as groups, instead of 
demographic factions. Although, admittedly, a demographic characteristic may place a 
person in one cultural group. Put differently, white males may be more individualistic 
given their place in history.27 Kahan and others recognize that individuals may associate 
with one or more categories, but that the individual s perceptions of risk would associate 
closely with the group to which they most closely identify.28 A simplified example is a 
 
 22. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 137 45 (2011) [hereinafter Kahneman (2011)] ( Paul 
Slovic probably knows more about the peculiarities of human judgment of risk than any other individual. His 
work offers a picture of Mr. and Ms. Citizen that is far from flattering: guided by emotion rather than by reason, 
easily swayed by trivial details, and inadequately sensitive to differences between low and negligibly low 
probabilities. ). 
 23. Dan Kahan attributes that cultural cognition is a variety of interpreting the work of cultural theory of risk 
as was set forth by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 726 28 ( This entry 
examines two related frameworks for the study of popular risk perceptions: the cultural theory of risk, associated 
with the work of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982); and the cultural cognition of risk, a focus of recent work by 
various researchers including myself. ). 
 24. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 727 (explaining the grid/group scheme that predicts how an individual s 
perception of risk that reflects and reinforces their cultural way of life). 
 25. Id. at 728 ( The cultural theory of risk makes two basic claims about the relationship between cultural 
ways of life  so defined and risk perceptions. The first is that discrete constellations of perceived risk tend to 
cohere better with one or another way of life. Forms of conduct understood to inflict collective harm invite 
restriction, and the people who engage in such behavior censure and blame (Douglas 1992). [. . .] The second 
claim of cultural theory is that individuals gravitate toward perceptions of risk that advance the way of life to 
which they are committed. ); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE 
SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 1, 8 (Univ. Cal. Press 1982) ( Risk taking and 
risk aversion, shared confidence and shared fears, are part of the dialogue on how best to organize social 
relations. ). 
 26. Id. at 727 fig.28.1 (showing the group-grid scheme); id. at 731 fig.28.3 (showing scales). 
 27. Id. at 741. Kahan explains the white male effect  by suggesting (maybe concluding) that this can be 
understood by placing the white males on the scale to explain the underlying reason why white males might be 
grouped together by their risk perception. 
 28. Id. at 734 35 ( A certain measure of heterogeneity among individuals is perfectly consistent with there 
being aggregations of persons who exert a dominant influence on social structures and affiliated worldviews 
(Braman et al. eds., 2005). Under either of these conditions, we would expect individuals to form packages of 
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participant s perception of climate change: a communitarianism-oriented participant might 
support combatting climate change because of the effect on the group and future 
generations whereas a participant associated with individualism might oppose combatting 
climate change because it impacts their business with additional regulatory compliance. 
Underscoring this is that each participant s association with their culture demonstrates 
their perception of the risk of climate change. Empirical studies testing cultural cognition 
place participants on a group-grid  scheme and reliably predict the respondents  
perception of risk.29 
Notably, Dan Kahan collaborates closely with Paul Slovic (discussed above as the 
pioneer of the affect heuristic), which allows cross-pollination discussion and testing of 
the interplay of multiple decision-making theories. Kahan recognizes that the 
psychological concepts and cultural associations are mechanisms that can both exist at the 
same time.30 
Interestingly, Kahan and colleagues found that even when subjects were not familiar 
with a specific technology, such as nanotechnology, they still assessed or assigned risk in 
a way that broke them into their cultural groups.31 This could suggest that risk perception 
is based on cultural identity either much more so or exclusive of familiarity. Or, as Kahan 
suggests, that those with more individualistic groupings are more likely to learn about 
nanotechnology and then see it as low risk.32 And, this cultural grouping explains why 
they become familiar with the technology and then are able to assign a low risk. 
Work by Kahan and others suggests that simply providing people with information 
will not change their risk assessment. To do so, information must be provided in a way 
that affirms their cultural identities, only then can the subjects have a better chance of 
appropriately assigning risk.33 In other words, opposing groups can come to the same 
conclusion depending on how the information is presented.34 In this way, risk perception 
 
risk perceptions characteristic of their groups in proportion to the strength or degree of the attachment to the 
cultural groups with whom they are most closely affiliated (cf. Manton et al. 1992). That s basically what our 
measures are designed to show. ). 
 29.  Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 740 fig.28.8 (showing that perceived risks are correlated with world 
views). 
 30. Id. at 739 ( Whether or not viewed as faithful to Douglas s vision, studies using psychometric concepts 
and methods have identified a variety of discrete mechanisms of cultural cognition. ); See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, 
Donald Braman, Paul Slovic, John Gastil & Geoffrey Cohen, Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of 
Nanotechnology, 4 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 89 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan et al. (2008)] ( Social 
psychology is making important advances in identifying techniques for framing information on controversial 
policy issues in a manner that makes it possible for people of diverse values to derive the same factual information 
from it. ). 
 31. Kahan et al. (2008), supra note 30, at 87 ( Holding cultural-worldviews constant (at the sample mean), 
information exposure does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that either a subject who is relatively 
unfamiliar with nanotechnology or one who is relatively familiar with it will perceive the benefits of 
nanotechnology to be greater than its risks. ). 
 32. Id. at 88 ( The second finding sheds some light on what the influence or set of influences might be. 
Regressing self-reported familiarity with nanotechnology on various individual characteristics revealed that 
being simultaneously hierarchical and individualistic predicted greater familiarity with nanotechnology. ). 
 33. Kahan (2012), supra note 2, at 753 ( Cultural-identity affirmation hypothesizes that you can get the same 
effect when you communicate information about risk in a way that affirms rather than threatens their cultural 
worldview. ). 
 34. Id. (describing an experiment in which subjects were presented with information about global warming 
that threatened or affirmed their world view and found biased assimilation with a vengeance. ). 
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can be aligned with evidence-based risk assessment even if participants lean towards one 
cultural group versus another. 
D. Heuristics and Dual Process Theory 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman s important work on decision-making is 
ground-breaking.35 While an enormous body of literature surrounds their work, this article 
seeks to simplify their work in an effort to make it digestible. Their work can be broken 
down into two related categories: heuristics and dual process.36 These categories help to 
explain each other. 
The first category addresses preferences as signals of risk aversion and is known as 
heuristics. This theory provides that people rely on heuristics principles to simplify 
assessing probabilities, but that sometimes these heuristics lead to errors.37 Underscoring 
this theory are biases that impact decision-making discussed in turn below. 
The first bias is Representativeness.38 In this bias, people associate certain 
characteristics with a particular class.39 For example, if a person is described as shy, 
withdrawn, and very helpful, and then people are asked to choose from a likely occupation 
that the person is a librarian or physician, people are likely to associate the person as being 
a librarian.40 This is true, even though there are many more physicians than librarians, but 
people do not consider such an important factor in their assessment.41 In other tested 
scenarios, Tversky and Kahneman note that other probabilities, such as sample size, 
misconceptions of chance, and predictability, are also ignored in this bias.42 
The second bias is Availability.43 In this bias, people are influenced by the ease with 
 
 35. See generally Kahneman (2011), supra note 22 (book summarizing Kahneman s contributions to this 
field). 
 36. Id. at 8 (describing a publication in Science that provided research based on years of collaboration and 
experimentation: It described the simplifying shortcuts of intuitive thinking and explained some 20 biases as 
manifestations of these heuristics  and also as demonstrations of the role of heuristics in judgment. ). 
 37. Tversky and Kahneman, supra note 2, at 3 ( This article shows that people rely on a limited number of 
heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and 
systematic errors. ). 
 38. Id. at 4 (Representativeness refers to when probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A is 
representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B. ). 
 39. Id. (providing an example in which a person is described as follows: Steve is very shy and withdrawn, 
invariably helpful, but with little interest in people, or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need 
for order and structure, and a passion for detail. Participants are then asked the probability that Steve is engaged 
in a particular profession by choosing from a list of professions. Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated that people 
order the likelihood of a particular profession by the degree to which Steve represents a typical person in that 
profession.). 
 40. Id. (describing Steve, as noted in the previous footnote, and learning that people think Steve is a librarian). 
 41. Id. ( This approach to the judgment of probability leads to serious errors, because similarity, or 
representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgments of probability. ). 
 42. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2, at 4 11 (describing insensitivities, misconceptions, and illusions 
that contribute to the representativeness bias). 
 43. Id. at 11 ( Availability is a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability, because instances of large 
classes are usually reached better and faster than instances of less frequent classes. However, availability is 
affected by factors other than frequency and probability. Consequently, the reliance on availability leads to 
predictable biases, some of which are illustrated below. ). 
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which the frequency or probability of an event can be brought to their mind.44 In their 
work, Tversky and Kahneman use the example that a person may assess the risk of a heart 
attack in a middle-aged person by calling to the front of their mind whether any of their 
middle-aged acquaintances have had heart attacks.45 But, as Tversky and Kahneman note, 
this decision-making process leads to biases.46 These biases can be based on the ability to 
retrieve information, which leads to probability or frequency biases.47 Other deficiencies 
include the effectiveness of a search set, the ability to construct probabilities, and pairing 
events that are not necessarily correlated.48 
The third bias is Adjustment and Anchoring.49 In this bias, people start with an initial 
value and then adjust.50 This is problematic if either the initial value or the adjustment is 
incorrect.51 People can be given different initial values, but if they make the same 
adjustment, they will conclude different results. Other problems with this bias include 
difficulty evaluating conjunctive and disjunctive events and subjective probability 
distribution.52 
In sum, this category/theory is concerned with cognitive biases that impact the 
heuristic to which people rely on to make decisions and perceive risk.53 In other words, 
subjective probability is different than actual probability. People do this without realizing 
it and begs the larger question as to whether these heuristics can be overcome to allow 
people to make risk assessments that are in line with evidence-based risk assessments. 
The second category, Dual Process theory, addresses the distinction between 
thinking fast and slow or, in other words, the subconscious versus the conscious.54 Daniel 
 
 44. Id. ( There are situations in which people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event 
but the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. ). 
 45. Id. ( For example, one may assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling such 
occurrences among one s acquaintances. ). 
 46. Id. at 11 14. 
 47. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2, at 11 (providing a good example: It is a common experience that 
the subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car overturned by the side of the 
road. ). 
 48. Id. at 12 14 (describing how other biases lead to systematic errors). 
 49. Id. at 14 ( in many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to 
yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, 
or it may be the result of partial computation. In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient (Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1971). That is, different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial 
values. We call this phenomenon anchoring. ). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 2, at 14 18 (discussing the problems, including biases, in anchoring 
and adjustment). 
 53. Id. at 18 20 ( This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgments under 
uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge probability that an 
object or event A belongs to class or process B, (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed 
when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development, and (iii) 
adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. 
These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. 
A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgments and 
decisions in situations of uncertainty. ). 
 54. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 20 21 ( System 1 operated automatically and quickly, with little or 
no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that 
demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective 
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Kahneman describes this theory as what happens when someone compares facial 
recognition, which is usually done quickly, with multiplying multi-digit numbers, which 
usually requires effort.55 Of course, the more a person must slow down to think about 
something, the more effort that must be dedicated to such a decision. The quick thinking, 
or in this example facial recognition, is referred to as system 1.56 The slow thinking, or 
this example multiplying multi-digit numbers, is referred to as system 2.57 
The limitations of the fast thinking (system 1) are that a person utilizes what they 
can quickly recall without the time or effort to obtain additional information.58 Kahneman 
refers to this as natural intuition, which serves humans well at least in some 
circumstances.59 But, intuition leads to mistakes.60 This is not necessarily distinct from 
the biases discussed under Heuristics, described above, since these biases are the bases of 
quick thinking.61 
The slow thinking (system 2) is what we generally refer to as analytical and 
logical.62 Some describe this slower thinking as based on algorithms, for example, which 
allow multiple inputs, control for variables, and then reasoned probabilities.63 But, biases 
can still underscore assumptions which create the very algorithms to which the slow 
thinking person relies on, even if the bias is unconscious.64 Nevertheless, even if biases 
are present in both fast and slow thinking, dual process theory still has legs because other 
parts of the cognitive process are different. The slower thinking process is thought to have 
procedures to override the subconscious mind that is driving the fast thinking.65 
At issue in the dual process theory is how people learn to think slow.66 Is it through 
age? Is it through education? Is it though experience? Is it from an internal mechanism? Is 
it from an external mechanism? Can people be taught to think consciously? Pierre Noel 
 
experience of agency, choice, and concentration. ). 
 55. Id. at 19 20. 
 56. Id. at 20 21. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 25 ( The division of labor between System 1 and System 2 is highly efficient: it minimizes effort 
and optimizes performance. The arrangement works well most of the time because System 1 is generally very 
good at what it does: its models of familiar situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually accurate 
as well, and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate. System 1 has biases, however, 
systematic errors that it is prone to make in specified circumstances. ). 
 59. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 25 30. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Pierre Noel Barrouillet, Dual-Process Theories and Cognitive Development: Advances and Challenges, 
31 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 79, 79 80 (2011) ( The famous studies by Kahneman and Tversky on judgment and 
decision making (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982) completed the portrait of reasoning driven by a set of 
heuristics that departs from any logic or normative theory. Overall, the so-called heuristics and biases  literature 
deeply disconfirmed the presumed rationality of adult human beings. ). 
 62. Barrouillet, supra note 61, at 80 ( Inherently deliberative, conscious, controlled, slow, and demanding in 
working memory resources, this second type of processing or system is probably unique to humans and assumed 
to underpin analytical, logical reasoning and normative responses. ). 
 63. Id. at 81 84 (describing studies addressing dual process thinking); Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 
29 30. 
 64. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 109 18 (describing how the law of small numbers can create a bias 
in system 1, and even system 2, thinking). 
 65. Barrouillet, supra note 61, at 81 (describing the work of Jonathan Evan s work regarding dual process 
thinking). 
 66. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 354 62. 
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Barrouillet, in a discussion of the facets of dual process theory, raises the variable that 
biases perhaps increase with age along with experience, and thus even though we expect 
adults to have more of a handle on slow thinking, it is possible that reliance on intuition 
can increase with age.67 This query is spurred by the work of Reyna and Brainerd, which 
refers to this as the fuzzy-trace theory.68 
In sum, both heuristics and dual process theory differentiate between intuition or 
sub-conscious decisions with deliberate or conscious decisions. Scholarship in this area 
acknowledges that biases and heuristics cannot be divorced from these thinking processes 
and might even be layered into them.69 Some may question whether the slow and 
deliberative thinking necessarily leads to better decisions, which for the purposes of this 
paper, refers to decisions that appropriately assign risk.70 
E. The Problem with Decision-Making 
All of these theories are empirically tested and so there is no reason to reject that 
they help us to understand how people make decisions. The problem is that they can be in 
conflict and lead to different results, which begs the question about which theory may 
explain a particular decision at a given time. For example, a vaccine hesitant parent (VHP) 
may decide not to vaccinate, but at the same time may be concerned about climate change 
and make decisions for the good of the community. These are inconsistent results if only 
explained by the cultural cognition theory. The cultural cognition theory likely predicts 
that someone who trends towards egalitarianism on climate change (i.e., good for the 
community) would similarly decide the same way about long-standing vaccines also a 
community-oriented position.71 Cultural cognition, as valid and compelling as it is, is not 
the only explanation for decision-making.  
One concern about decision-making is that the strength of the processes underlying 
any decision is not static. At times, affect may be the prevailing thinking process which 
could conflict with how the person would make the decision if cultural cognition was the 
only thinking process at play. Perhaps this is not a controversial idea; certainly none of the 
proponents of each theory propose that their theory is the only theory. But, it begs the 
question of how to know which theory (or theories) are most likely dominating for any 
particular decision especially when the person inappropriately assigns risk so that 
policies can be communicated to that person in such a way that they can appropriately 
assign risk. 
Another problem, perhaps, is how changes in society impact how people make 
 
 67. Barrouillet, supra note 61, at 83 84. 
 68. Id. at 84 ( As all the other dual-process theories, the fuzzy-trace theory distinguishes between analytical 
thinking, which is slow and conscious, and intuition that operates quickly, out of consciousness. ). 
 69. Kahneman (2011), supra note 22, at 109 95 (discussing how bias and heuristics explain system 1 and 
system 2 thinking). 
 70. An example is the Invisible Gorilla experiment in which participants are engaged in an engrossing task 
and may not see the person wearing the gorilla suit enter the picture. Daniel Kahneman, Of 2 Minds: How Fast 
and Slow Thinking Shape Perception and Choice [Excerpt], SCI. AM., (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/kahneman-excerpt-thinking-fast-and-slow/. 
 71. It is possible that a vaccine made from new technology might be seen as riskier by the communitarian-
egalitarianism group-grid. Work by Kahan suggests that this group-grid might be more risk adverse. Kahan 
(2012), supra note 2, at 740 fig.28.8. 
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decisions, if at all. How, for example, does the internet impact how we assess these 
theories, at least with respect to a variable within an empirical study? Are VHPs finding a 
community of other VHPs on-line? Research already demonstrates that those that group 
towards communitarianism already perceive technology as more-risky and now they can 
find a group with like-minded perceptions.72 Or, is it receipt of information online leading 
to fear of vaccination leading to life-long debilitating side effects (for which there is zero 
evidence) that impacts the decisions made by VHPs? 
Over the past seventy years, our society has moved towards an individualistic 
society.73 How does the movement towards individualism impact decision-making? In the 
1950s, for example, people lived in smaller communities and had some stake in their 
communities.74 This, of course, had all sorts of externalities by promoting racism and 
bigotry, for example, and with the change towards expressing feelings and individualism, 
we moved away from racism (sort of), but an entirely new set of problems arose.75 Perhaps 
we moved too far away from community and a person s perception of their place in a 
larger community may be distorted.76 This begs the question as to how the prevailing 
decision-making theories can incorporate this. Most likely, they can. 
In addition, well-funded groups create confusion in the marketplace.77 A large anti-
GMO campaign, for example, undoubtedly contributes to the inappropriate assignment of 
risk to this technology. These anti-GMO groups provide misinformation in a way that 
exploits how people make decisions, using fear, for example.78  
These variables: (1) individualism, (2) internet, and (3) economics, provide factors 
that impact the way people make decisions as it relates to risk perception. A further 
discussion of this problem, along with suggestions to address the problem, is the subject 
of Part IV. Before that discussion, this article acknowledges that strategies exist to 
implement policies that seek to align the public s perception of risk with evidence-based 
assessment of risk. 
 
 72. Id. at 744 (discussing how participants respond to information about a new technology in a biased 
manner supportive of a predisposition toward risk. ). 
 73. See DAVID BROOKS, THE SECOND MOUNTAIN 6 20 (2019). 
 74. Id. at 4 7. 
 75. Id. at 6 (describing a city as a collection of villages  but also admitting that this culture had failings, 
which ultimately made it intolerable. This moral ecology tolerated a lot of racism and anti-Semitism. Housewives 
felt trapped and stifled, and professional women faced daunting barriers. In 1963, Betty Friedman described a 
problem that had no name, which was the flattening, crushing boredom of many female lives. The culture had an 
emotionally cold definition of masculinity; men had trouble expressing love for their wives and children. The 
food was really boring. People felt imprisoned by the pressure of group conformity and tortured by the intolerant 
tyranny of local opinion. Many played out their assigned social roles, but they were dead inside. ). 
 76. Id. at 18 (discussing the problem of the Instagram life and stating: The problem is that the person in the 
aesthetic phase sees life as possibilities to be experienced and not projects to be fulfilled or ideals to be lived out. 
He will hover above everything but never land. In the aesthetic way of life, each individual day is fun, but it 
doesn t seem to add up to anything. ). 
 77. See, e.g., U.S. RIGHT TO KNOW, (last visited Jan. 22, 2020), https://usrtk.org/ (a well-funded anti-GMO 
group); see also, Alex Berezow & Gary Ruskin, GMO Labeling Movement Funded by Anti-Vaxxers, AM. 
COUNCIL ON SCI. & HEALTH, (May 8, 2017), https://www.acsh.org/news/2017/05/08/gary-ruskin-gmo-labeling-
movement-funded-anti-vaxxers-11245. 
 78. MARK LYNAS, SEEDS OF SCIENCE 140 44 (2018) (describing how anti-GMO activists make claims about 
the side effects of eating GMOs, including, for example, that children will be born with the head of a corn plant). 
Although, admittedly, the manufacturers of GMO seeds, such as Monsanto, are also well-funded. But, Monsanto 
does not appear to be able to manipulate consumers into choosing foods from GMOs. 
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II. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
The following highlights tools used for policy implementation in which the purpose 
is for the consumer to make a decision in line with expert analysis of risk. These tools are 
designed to change behavior, although they do so in different ways. Although numerous 
tools exist, this article focuses on those that interact with decision-making theories. Below 
is a descriptive narrative with a discussion in Part IV regarding how these tools adequately 
or inadequately accomplish their goals in light of decision-making, particularly in the area 
of emerging biotechnology. The three main tools discussed include nudging, risk 
communication and risk perception (Risk Hybrid), and public participation through notice 
and comment. 
A. Nudging 
Nudging is defined as liberty-preserving approaches that steer people in particular 
directions, but that also allow them to go their own way. 79 An example of nudging is 
automatic enrollment in a retirement plan this nudges  a person to save for retirement, 
but the person can also opt out.80 The person is not required to save for retirement, but the 
auto enrollment steers the person to do so. The hallmark of nudging is that it allows the 
person freedom of choice and transparency with generally low (or no) cost.81 This makes 
nudging distinct from rules or government decisions that are coercive or hidden from 
public scrutiny.82 
Importantly, effective nudges need to be based on evidence.83 Effective nudges are 
those that understand how people will respond, or in other words, how people will make 
decisions. In his work, Cass Sunstein describes ten important mechanisms of nudges: (1) 
default rules (e.g., auto-enrollment in retirement plan); (2) simplification (e.g., easy to 
navigate); (3) uses of social norms (e.g., behave this way because most others do); (4) 
increase in ease and convenience (e.g., healthy food options most visible); (5) disclosure 
(e.g., environmental harm with dirty energy use); (6) warnings (e.g., cigarette labels); (7) 
precommitment strategies (e.g., committing to a future action such as smoking cessation); 
(8) reminders (e.g., text message reminder); (9) eliciting implementation intentions (e.g., 
will you vaccinate your child?); and (10) informing people of the nature and consequences 
of their own past choices (e.g., how much they spent on electricity last year).84 
The problem with nudging is that it assumes people will respond appropriately to 
the nudge. Of course, Cass Sunstein and others acknowledge that nudges need to be 
empirically tested, and it is possible that a particular nudge does not create the result 
intended.85 If that is the case, then the nudge needs to be changed. This provides a 
 
 79. Cass R. Sunstein, Nudging: A Very Short Guide, 37 J. CONSUMER POL Y 583, 583 (2014). 
 80. Id. (describing examples of nudges, including: informing customers that a bill is due, automatic 
enrollment in a retirement plan, auto pay options for credit cards, and mortgages). 
 81. Id. at 584 (providing the rationale and examples of how nudges allow people to maintain freedom of 
choice and that nudges should be transparent and open rather than hidden and covert. ). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 585 ( For all policies, including nudges, it is exceedingly important to rely on evidence rather than 
intuitions, anecdotes, wishful thinking, or dogmas. ). 
 84. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 585 87 (describing ten important nudges). 
 85. Id. at 585 ( But some policies, including some nudges, seem promising in the abstract but turn out to fail 
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tremendous amount of flexibility in the implementation of any policy that seeks particular 
behaviors and can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner.  
Emerging technologies present a distinct issue because of risk perception. People 
tend to prefer a known risk even if it is higher than a likely lower risk with a new 
technology.86 Nudging people to take the new, likely lower risk, creates challenges. It is 
possible to increase the ease and convenience of buying foods from GMOs, but this nudge 
may not be effective given the overwhelming marketing done by the organic food industry. 
It is not that a nudge could not work, but it raises questions of efficacy in the biotechnology 
arena that need to be explored. 
B. Risk Hybrid 
Perhaps a hybrid of decision-making theory and policy implementation, the concept 
of Performativity helps explain the effect of risk communication on a person s assignment 
of risk. Work by P. Marijin Poorvliet, Kai Purnhagen, and others attempt to distinguish 
between risk as perception and risk as analysis although as a reality, they acknowledge 
these categories are not realistically exclusive and suggest the term risk hybrid.87 In this 
way, Poorvliet and Purnhagen frame the real problem, which is how risk communication 
impacts risk assessment.88 
The idea of risk hybrid, in which the subjective and objective communication of risk 
meet, is particularly apt in controversial areas. Political views, divergent perspectives, 
industrial parties, and scientists may have divergent perceptions.89 How these modalities 
are communicated to people impact the development of the risk debate.90 This perception 
of risk helps to explain or understand how people make decisions in which they 
appropriately or inappropriately assign risk.91 While it may seem that objective risk 
assessment should be the preferred method of communication in order for people to make 
an appropriate assessment of risk, the reality is that people receive both objective and 
subjective information. To further complicate matters, even an objective risk assessment 
may really be a probability; thus, some range of risk exists depending on a number of 
assumptions that may or may not hold.92 Therefore, any discussion of risk communication 
 
in practice. ). 
 86.  Cf. Ellsberg, supra note 2, at 657. 
 87. P. Marijn Poortvliet, Martjin Duineveld & Kai Purnhagen, Performativity in Action: How Risk 
Communication Interacts in Risk Regulation, 7 EURO. J. RISK REG. 213, 214 (2016) ( Objectified and perceived 
risks will be difficult  if not sometimes impossible  to separate in practice. As an alternative we introduce the 
concept of risk hybrids, which combines objectified risk (how the risk is represented in risk analysis) and a 
perceived risk and nullifies the a-priory made distinction between the two. ). 
 88. Id. ( By observing how different risk communications perform different risk hybrids in the various 
contexts in which they emerge, we show how the concept of risk hybrids can offer a richer understanding of risk 
communication practices. ). 
 89. Id. at 213 ( Numerous reasons, such as divergent perspectives, ways of communication, and interests, 
explain why involved actors often find themselves locked in a controversy. ). 
 90. Id. ( For instance, in the GMO debates environmental politicians, NGOs, industrial parties, consumers, 
and GMO scientists have exerted very distinct ways of communication, resulting in a highly polarized and 
contested gene-risk landscape ). 
 91. Id. ( A key conceptual distinction made within such debates, among academics, in the literature, and in 
wider society, is one between perceived or subjective risks on the one hand, and factual or objective risks on the 
other. ). 
 92. Poortvliet, supra note 87, at 214 ( In risk assessment many different conceptualizations of risk and 
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and the impact thereof must acknowledge this reality. 
How risk is communicated to people is extremely important for policy 
implementation. In general, good government policy is supported by an evidence-based 
risk assessment. In some cases the evidence-based risk assessment is correct. But, what 
happens when it is wrong? People may lose trust in the government and its policies. This 
potential distrust can also sway a balance in a risk hybrid communication scenario, where 
people might believe perceived risks over objective risks, especially if they distrust that an 
objective risk assessment is possible. 
Even assuming arguendo that people do not distrust, or have no reason to distrust, 
an objective risk assessment, research demonstrates that people do not necessarily make 
rational decisions.93 In other words, perceived risks help us to understand why people may 
inappropriately assign risk (e.g., assigning a higher risk to flying than driving a car).94 
Because government actors are not the only communicators of risk, studying how 
risk communication impacts people s risk assessment is quite challenging. The media may 
pick up a story and their risk communication can insert a different ratio in the risk hybrid
either more objective or more perceived. Other interested actors, say those that oppose a 
particular regulation, may also communicate risk. Obtaining an understanding of these 
influences and how to communicate evidence-based risk assessment poses an enormous 
challenge. 
C. Notice and Comment 
Public participation through notice and comment may also present a way for the 
public to engage and be informed in regulatory policy creation and implementation. 
Important work by Ed Rubin and others analyze the mechanisms in which agencies can 
implement policies either through voluntary guidance documents or a formal rulemaking 
process with notice and comment.95 Without describing the intricate machinations of how 
an agency knows whether to use guidance or formal rulemaking, the larger message is the 
ability for the public to engage with the agency through the notice and comment process.  
Rubin proposes that, in cases in which the policy addresses an issue subject to public 
controversy, agencies should engage in notice and comment.96 The purpose is not just for 
 
uncertainty can be used. Examples of risk concepts include risk as an expected value, as a probability distribution, 
as an expected disutility, as an epistemic or stochastic uncertainty, as a simple threshold level for when a 
substance is deemed to be hazardous and so forth. ). 
 93. Id. at 213 14 (discussing the difference between perceived and actual risk). 
 94. Id. at 215 ( For example, some travelers are quite worried about the safety of taking a plane but [sic] not 
even consider the  statistically much greater  risk of driving to the airport. ). 
 95. Edward L. Rubin & Joanna K. Sax, Administrative Guidance and Genetically Modified Food, 60 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 539, 566 (2018) ( In our system, the specific technique to which the term guidance  has generally been 
attached is a type of rule under the APA. Section 553 of the APA prescribes procedures for two types of 
rulemaking: formal rulemaking, which must follow the same trial-type procedures as adjudications under section 
556 and 557 of the statute, and informal rulemaking, which must follow only the much less demanding notice 
and comment procedure specified in section 553 itself. ). This article was co-authored, but the intellectual muscle 
related to administrative law is properly attributed to Ed Rubin. 
 96. Id. at 582 ( A remedially oriented approach to the review of guidance documents would satisfy both the 
instrumental and normative goals of notice and comment procedure and the countervailing goal of rulemaking 
flexibility. To begin with, this approach suggests that notice and comment rulemaking should only be imposed 
on agency pronouncements to the general public. ). 
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good government practices; rather, it is a way for the public to participate and to 
(hopefully) be educated in the process. Both the engagement and the education may allow 
people to appropriately assign risk when the final rule, for example, is implemented.  
Agencies should rely on evidence-based assessments to support any policy 
implementation. In addition, the actors within the agency are supposed to be able to 
differentiate between scientific support and consumer misperception. Assuming the actors 
within the agency behave this way, an assumption that may not always stand, the final 
policy should assign the evidence-based risk assessment. But, the process to obtain the 
final policy is what could allow people to come to the same conclusion as the agency or, 
at least, be educated through the process. Then, once the policy is enacted, through a final 
rule or other mechanism, the space between the agenc  evidence-based assessment of 
risk and the person s own risk assessment should align. 
D. Overview of Risk-Communication Strategies 
The strategies outlined above describe a mere sampling of ways to attempt to align 
people s perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk. This is a non-
exclusive list; rather, its purpose is to describe some thoughtful and well-studied 
mechanisms for policy implementation that consider behavior and decision-making. 
Additional examples exist but are not necessarily needed to support the main thesis of this 
article, which is to assess the problems with decision-making as it relates to the 
implementation of policies for biotechnology and the attempt to reconcile this issue with 
ways to align people s perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk.  
Aligning people s perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk is not 
an easy task. A tremendous amount of money is spent to sway people in a particular 
direction. The organic food industry, for example, has an economic interest in steering 
people away from bioengineered food. This is an intentional example where big money in 
a big industry is at play. Other examples are much less intentional. The anti-vax 
movement, for example, may not have the same economic incentives (although perhaps 
there is big money in holistic and snake oil applications), but the impact on people is 
similar. In both of these cases, large groups of people inappropriately assign risk to areas 
in which the scientific assessment of risk is low. This begs the important question raised 
in this article, which is: how do we align risk perception with risk assessment? 
III. CONTROVERSIAL AREAS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
Biotechnology in some ways faces a unique problem and in other ways faces the 
same problem as any other decision. The unique fact is that biotechnology is often future 
facing, which means some risks will always be unknown.97 From a scientific perspective, 
these unknowns are not problematic. Scientists can predict the likelihood of risk. But, this 
is highly problematic for consumers who may want to hear that there is no chance of future 
harm. For example, scientists reached a consensus that food in the marketplace that is from 
 
 97. Sax (2017), supra note 12, at 474 [S]cientific uncertainty is part of the scientific process. Unknowns 
always exist in science, but this is different than having enough information to be able to assign a probability of 
risk. Consumers may have trouble differentiating between scientific uncertainty and risk. ). 
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genetically engineered organisms (colloquially known as GMOs) is as safe as conventional 
food.98 But, scientists cannot unequivocally state that GMOs will never have any risk in 
the future. Similarly, scientists cannot unequivocally say that conventional and organic 
food products will never present a harm in the future. This is not how evidence-based risk 
assessment works. Not only do consumers have a difficult time assigning risk, but this 
scientific process is exploited by opponents to biotechnology.99 Opponents can 
communicate to consumers something as provocative as Even the scientists cannot tell 
you with 100% certainty that the food you are eating is safe. 100 This creates all sorts of 
problems that influence decision-making. 
Discussed below are examples of areas of biotechnology that are not controversial 
in the scientific community, but generate great controversy in the public sphere. Included 
in this discussion are empirical studies in which decision-making theories help to explain 
the discrepancy between consumer perception of risk and evidence-based assessment of 
risk, to the extent that such empirical studies are available. In addition, this section will 
highlight how different theoretical modes of decision-making, discussed in Part I, are 
implicated in the disconnect between consumer perception of risk and evidence-based 
assessment of risk. Furthermore, this section will discuss the thread within this article that 
decision-making is complicated and that more than one theoretical basis may help to 
explain the disconnect. In other words, we cannot think of the problem as silos; instead, 
this article argues that it has to be addressed as a wholescale problem. 
A. Genetically Engineered Food 
One of the most controversial areas of biotechnology in the modern world are crops 
 
 98. Chelsea Snell et al., Assessment of the Health Impact of GM Plant Diets in Long-term and 
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AAAS]; Yan Song et al., Immunotoxicological Evaluation of Corn Genetically Modified with Bacillus 
thuringiensis Cry1Ah Gene by a 30-day Feeding Study in BALB/c Mice, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 10 (2014) 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0078566; Yanfang Yuan et al., 
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Rats, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (2012), 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0052507; see also Philip D. Brune et 
al., Safety of GM Crops: Compositional Analysis, 1 J. AGRIC. & FOOD CHEMISTRY 8243, 8245 (2013); William 
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the Regulation of Food and Feed Derived from Genetically Modified Crops: Interpretation of Composition Data, 
1 J. AGRIC. FOOD & CHEMISTRY 8349, 8353 (2013); Declan Butler, Hyped GM Maize Study Faces Growing 
Scrutiny, NATURE INT L WKLY. J. SCI. (2012), http://www.nature.com/news/hyped-gm-maize-study-faces-
growing-scrutiny-1.11566 (rejecting paper that found adverse health events in rats fed GM corn); Mischa 
Popoff et al., Organics versus GMO: Why the debate?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/10/15/organics-versus-gmo-why-the-debate/; A. Mukherjee et al., 
Preharvest Evaluation of Coliforms, Escherichia coli, Salmonella, and Escherichia coli O157:H7 in Organic and 
Conventional Produce Grown by Minnesota Farmers, 67 J. FOOD PROTECTION 894, 894 900 (2004). 
 99.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 100. Cf. Slovic & Peters, supra note 11, at 322 (explaining how the use of emotion can lead to an inappropriate 
assignment of risk). 
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produced from the application of biotechnology.101 These are colloquially called GMOs, 
but this term is completely inadequate because some crops created through the use of 
biotechnology are not genetically modified organisms. While the term bioengineering  is 
a more apt description, and the one being used by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) in implementing the new labeling law, consumers recognize and 
utilize the term GMO.102 In addition, the label GMO-free  means something to 
consumers. For this reason, this article will use the colloquial term GMO,  not only due 
to its familiarity, but also for the reason that it will more likely be read by consumers who 
are interested in learning about GMOs. 
Plants have highly dynamic genomes, and it may surprise a non-scientist to learn 
that plants have a lot of changes occurring to their DNA all of the time.103 Actually, this 
is one of the reasons that GMOs do not pose any higher risk compared to conventional 
breeding techniques.104 A small change to a plant s DNA through biotechnology 
techniques is less invasive than what happens through traditional breeding techniques.105 
Either way, if the change to the genome through biotechnology or traditional breeding 
techniques creates genomic instability, the plant will simply die. If the plant can withstand 
the change, it will survive and grow.106  
For some crops, the genomes are already highly selected through traditional 
breeding techniques, and the only way to obtain another favorable trait is through the 
application of techniques in biotechnology. This is particularly true for clonally 
propagated and highly heterozygous crops, which already have highly selected 
background.107 No form of traditional breeding technique can likely achieve such a result, 
or even if it could achieve it theoretically, the likelihood that traditional breeding could 
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 107. Strauss & Sax, supra note 103, at 475. 
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obtain it through mutation or otherwise is so remote that it is simply not a feasible 
approach.108  
The science behind GMOs is probably the most fascinating part of the relatively 
easy explanation as to why food from GMOs is as safe as conventional food.109 Oddly, 
some people do not even have an inkling that all of our crops are genetically modified 
because we grow domesticated crops which by definition are genetically modified.110 
The label organic  does not mean that it is a wild-type variety.111 Rather, it is a 
genetically modified crop that is grown under organic  farming techniques.112 In other 
words, everything we eat is genetically modified. That people are concerned about GMOs 
because it is messing  with the DNA demonstrates a complete lack of understanding 
about our food supply.113 Ignorance is not the only explanation; however, the 
complications in decision-making and risk assessment are critical in this misunderstanding 
as well. 
The controversy around GMOs has not been ignored by those interested in decision-
making and consumer perceptions of risk. One study tested whether the theory of 
ambiguity aversion might help to explain the disconnect between consumer risk perception 
and evidence-based risk assessment.114 This study found that participants who responded 
to predictor questions in a way that suggested aversion to ambiguous information likewise 
responded to scenarios about foods from GMOs as being high risk and low benefit.115 In 
addition, participants who indicated an initial bias against foods from GMOs, similarly 
assigned high risk and low benefit to scenarios in which the risk of a food from a GMO 
was described as low.116 This study suggested that one component of decision-making, at 
least with respect to the disconnect over foods from GMOs, might be a result of ambiguity 
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aversion.117 These results allow policymakers to consider this decision-making process in 
generating and communicating policies regarding GMOs.118 
The role of affect in risk perception in various areas of technology is supported by 
numerous empirical studies. Specifically, for GMOs, studies indicate that implicit attitudes 
and affect impact how consumers perceive GMOs.119 These studies have some 
imperfections but at least provide some sense of how affect impacts risk perception and 
helps to explain why consumers perception of risk is different than evidence-based 
assessment of risk.  
One study analyzed whether fear or disgust served as the affective predictor in 
attitudes towards GMOs.120 This study used survey methodology and employed predictor 
questions to understand a range of responses to particular events, such as stepping on dog 
poop or seeing a cockroach run across the floor, to score affective measures of disgust.121 
Using these predictive measures, the authors could analyze the affective response to new 
technologies, including GMOs.122 The authors learned that participants demonstrated 
more of a creeped out feeling towards GMOs compared to a tendency to be disgusted. This 
tendency to be creeped out indicates that fear might be driving the opposition to GMOs as 
compared to disgust.123 The authors tied in the results of the study with other research 
demonstrating that when people understand technology, they do not tend to be as fearful 
or creeped out.124  
Cultural cognition may also help to explain people s differing views on GMOs.125 
The application of cultural cognition is done by analogy to other areas of technology in 
which researchers seek to understand consumer decision-making, such as nanotechnology. 
In one study the researchers found that providing balanced information about 
nanotechnology did not support a finding that familiarity with the subject might predict 
the assignment of risks and benefits.126 Instead, the authors found support that the 
participants  attitudes towards nanotechnology could be explained by psychological 
 
 117. Id. at 55 57. 
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dynamics associated with cultural cognition. 127 The authors hypothesized that even with 
balanced information, participants will not adopt uniformly positive attitudes, as the 
familiarity hypothesis suggests, [rather] members of the public who hold relatively 
egalitarian and communitarian worldviews will perceive its risks to be greater, and its 
benefits smaller, than will persons who hold relatively hierarchal and individualistic 
worldviews. 128 This study found that exposure to information had no discernable effect 
on the participants  perceptions of risks and benefits.129 Instead, the participants  
worldviews explained the risk assessment.130 When exposed to information about 
nanotechnology, it was clear that the participants  world view was the variable that most 
explained the risk assignment, at least under the experimental conditions.131 In other 
words, when provided with information about nanotechnology, participants conform[ed] 
information to their predispositions. 132 In this case, participants with a worldview 
associated with hierarchical and individualistic tended to be skeptical about technological 
risks. When provided with information about nanotechnology, they behaved as expected 
and did not assign a high risk.133 In contrast, participants associated with the egalitarian 
and communitarian point of view reacted less favorably when information about new 
technology was brought to their attention.134  
Although an empirical study is needed, the cultural cognition/nanotechnology study 
provides some insight as to how people may respond to information about GMOs.135 
Those that are generally skeptical about technological risk will assign a low risk and high 
benefit when provided information about foods made from GMOs.136 Whereas, those with 
a worldview that is skeptical of technology will respond in the opposite direction. This 
begs the question that is discussed in section IV, which is whether to provide balanced 
information at all? In other worlds, one might think a priori that providing balanced 
information is the fairest approach. But, if providing balanced information does not allow 
people to appropriately assign risk, or at least align their risk perception with evidence-
based risk assessment, then providing balanced information may not accomplish the 
goal.137 
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Availability heuristics and dual process theory also help to underscore the public 
opposition to GMOs. With so much marketing against GMOs, it makes sense that 
consumers  system 1 (or quick thinking) assumes that all GMOs are harmful.138 
Consumers can draw on commercials on television that tout their product is GMO free or 
the labels in the supermarket clearly stating that a product is GMO free.139 Even a bottle 
of carbonated water is labeled as GMO free which is completely silly.140 Still, all of this 
information is instant and present and feeds the system 1 decision-making process to think 
that if it is labeled as GMO free, then there must be a reason for it, and one reason could 
be safety.141 The slow thinking process of System 2 is needed to evaluate the scientific 
consensus that foods from GMOs are as safe as conventional food.142 In addition, the slow 
thinking process is needed to analyze the scientific research that the technology is likely 
beneficial to address malnutrition the leading cause of death and disease worldwide.143  
So, how would one get consumers to slow down and process the food labels with 
System 2? It seems unlikely. This means that some sort of communication method may be 
needed to support a system 1 process where consumers have a heuristic to draw on that 
food from GMOs are safe. Perhaps the removal of the GMO free label as misleading is 
one way, as some have called for. Or, perhaps some sort of label supporting GMOs, which 
allows consumers to quickly evaluate the safety that is in line with the evidence-based 
assessment of risk.  
Biotechnology presents an interesting application of decision-making theories 
because it is progressive and new information is discovered and applied. Scientific 
assessment of risk can never be absolute; it is simply a likely probability that the risk is 
determined to be high or low. This creates openings to exploit even a minimal risk and 
even a much lower risk compared to doing nothing. This is the case with our food supply
we have competing problems that need to be addressed: climate change and a growing 
population. We need to feed more people in a sustainable way. Doing nothing about how 
we grow our food is riskier than doing something. Bringing consumers along for this 
complicated discussion already poses challenges. In Part IV, this article discusses ways to 
approach this. But, in the vein of this article, another area of biotechnology in which 
rejecting the technology creates more harm, i.e., not vaccinating, is discussed below. 
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B. Vaccines 
As of late, vaccinating children is a serious and controversial issue.144 Some parents 
are hesitant or declining to vaccinate their children, which creates a major health issue for 
the unvaccinated children and a larger public health issue for the community.145 The 
movement against vaccines is surprising to health officials, especially considering the 
evidence-based research demonstrating that vaccines are safe and effective against vaccine 
preventable diseases.146 At first blush, one might simply say that parents who resist 
vaccinations are dumb (to be blunt), but studies in decision-making demonstrate that it is 
more complicated. 
An interesting study by Blaisdell and colleagues utilized focus groups to analyze 
whether ambiguity aversion helped to explain the decisions by vaccine hesitant parents 
(VHPs).147 In these focus groups, Blaisdell learned that VHPs inappropriately assigned 
risk because they responded that they were concerned, for example, that once a vaccine is 
given it cannot be undone.148 Interestingly, putting aside the need for boosters, this is 
exactly what medical professionals seek.149 But, the VHPs expressed that because it 
cannot be undone, then if there was some side effect, the parents have irreversibly harmed 
the child.150 In other words, the parents assigned a high risk and low benefit. Another 
expressed opinion by VHPs is that if their child gets the disease, then they can just take 
them to the hospital.151 VHPs inappropriately assigned a low risk to the actual disease. 
The study itself is worthy of a close read, but to summarize here, the study provided 
important insight to help understand how VHPs make decisions regarding whether or not 
to vaccinate.152 
Although not explicitly addressed by the Blaisdell study, it is possible that affect 
also plays a key role.153 The VHPs may fear that the vaccine will cause irreversible 
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damage, such as autism.154 This feeling of fear (or dread) may also help explain why VHPs 
assign a high risk and low benefit to vaccines.155 Feelings of fear and dread are known to 
impact decision-making and risk perception.156  
The application of cultural cognition to VHPs presents a few possible explanations. 
A priori, it might seem that persons placed on the group-grid  associated with the 
communitarianism-egalitarian viewpoint would vaccinate because this would be best for 
the community. But, if we think about the study on nanotechnology, those with a 
community point of view may be skeptical of new technology and perceive a high risk.157 
This could suggest that VHPs in the communitarianism-egalitarian group-grid could 
actually explain the hesitation to vaccinate, which, in the end, is actually worse for the 
community. In contrast, those with an individualistic outlook may assess the risk from new 
technology as low and be more likely to vaccinate. In other words, it is possible that 
cultural cognition helps to explain risk assessment in a way that helps us to understand 
VHPs. Alternatively, perhaps vaccines are not as new to individuals as nanotechnology. 
Thus, perhaps drawing on the nanotechnology study is too far a stretch.158 If so, then the 
egalitarian point of view favors vaccination because it protects the community. Or, perhaps 
a more cynical view is that VHPs form their own communities in which they form a 
consensus that vaccines are risky (making the non-evidence-based association with 
autism); thus, they either are hesitant to vaccinate or refuse altogether.159 This conforms 
with the viewpoint of their community. In sum, it seems that the viewpoint of the 
community could impact the risk assessment.160 
Heuristics and dual process theory can be used to explain decision made by VHPs. 
The system 1 decision-making process may perceive risk and if a person feels or believes 
that there is a risk to vaccines, such as autism, then that person may be hesitant or resist 
vaccines.161 The fear of a life-long condition, such as autism, is the undercurrent for the 
system 1 reaction against vaccines.162 Of course, we know that vaccines do not cause 
autism, but that may not be what a VHP believes.163 Likewise, a VHP, operating under 
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system 1, may not fear the vaccine preventable disease.164 This demonstrates the very 
problem with a VHP using system 1. It is fear, for example, that might be the crux of the 
system 1 decision but in this case, it is the fear of the wrong condition.165 The VHP 
should fear the vaccine preventable disease. The system 2 process, in which the VHP, 
might evaluate the data regarding the safety and efficacy of vaccines, is needed.166 For a 
non-VHP, the system 1 process kicks in to make the decision to vaccinate. In this case, the 
fear of the vaccine preventable disease is easy to process. No system 2 process is needed. 
In sum, the decision-making theories described herein all help to elucidate how 
consumers approach their thinking towards a controversial area of biotechnology. 
Cognitively, it makes sense that a discussion can be had regarding how each theory 
explains the public s reaction to GMOs and vaccines. What is unclear, however, is whether 
any person relies more heavily on one theory over another. How do we know which 
decision-making process is dominant at any time? Or, perhaps, portions of these theories 
are working concurrently. To add more to the mix, this article raises the concern about 
how changes in society interact, utilize, or even exploit these decision-making theories in 
a way that makes it even harder to combat an inappropriate assignment of risk. 
IV. MODERN VARIABLES THAT IMPACT DECISION-MAKING 
Assuming arguendo that all of the decision-making theories described in this article 
meaningfully describe how people make decisions (and possibly judgements), the salient 
question becomes how do we allow people to make decisions in which their risk perception 
is in line with evidence-based risk assessment. This does not mean that people will 
automatically embrace new technology just because their risk perception is in line with 
evidence-based risk assessment, but it means that people can make decisions based on 
accurate information. For example, a person may decide not to vaccinate, for a religious 
reason, but not based on a perception that vaccines are unsafe, or at least less safe than 
acquiring a vaccine preventable disease.  
It is not that the decision-making theories do not stand they do. The problem is 
that they can be used to persuade people into making an incorrect risk assessment. This is 
quite a concern because the world is facing major problems, such as climate change. This 
article proposes three categories in modern society that appear to impact consumer 
perceptions of risk. These three categories, which are variable inputs in people s 
perception of risk are: (1) rise of individualism, (2) internet, and (3) economics, which are 
discussed below. This article seeks to expose how these categories impact a person s 
assignment of risk. 
A. Rise of Individualism 
In his book, The Second Mountain, David Brooks describes changes in society from 
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small and tight communities to a more individualistic priority.167 Brooks acknowledges 
that this is not all bad. The small and tight communities from the 1950s, for example, bred 
racism and sexism.168 Breaking out of those communities, particularly in the 1960s, 
allowed for the civil rights movement, access to reproductive services, and more individual 
rights.169 These changes, which Brooks acknowledges, are positive. But, there are 
externalities to these changes in society. The movement from community to individualism 
has changed the level of happiness or joy, according to Brooks.170 In other words, people 
feel less connected to other people in their community because of the rise of individualism. 
Brooks suggests that the pendulum has moved too far, and we need to find a better balance 
of community and individualism.171 
This article does not necessarily agree or adopt the pathway laid by Brooks, but it is 
certainly provocative enough not to ignore. It is clear that society has changed from the 
1950s to today. It is correct that individual rights and freedoms are more recognized today 
compared to seventy years ago.172 Maybe people are less joyful, as Brooks suggests, 
although that is a tough one to analyze, and this article will not go down that path. 
Nevertheless, Brooks certainly targets individualism as a notable component of today s 
society, and that concept in and of itself is worthy of discussion. 
The decision-making theories described herein also face a structural problem in our 
society, which is how people obtain their information and how they view themselves in 
society at large.173 Described eloquently in The Second Mountain, David Brooks captures 
the tone of hyper-individualism and how that keeps us from connecting to one another.174 
The movement from small communities in the 1950s (which he acknowledges allowed for 
a lot of discrimination) towards individualism leads people to possibly be less happy and 
engaged in their surroundings.175 Some people search for connection in new ways, such 
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as online communities. This may, in turn, lead to group thinking, which can make it even 
harder to assess information and/or impact decision-making.  
Research in decision-making is certainly applicable to help us understand how 
people make decisions in a hyper-individualized society. For example, ambiguity aversion 
can be used to explain how people in an online group/community (e.g., Facebook group) 
may receive information about a link between vaccines and autism, which they cannot 
completely ignore even when a doctor tells them that no such link exists. In essence, the 
decision-making theories are robust and can continue to explain decision-making even 
when society changes. 
Here is a scenario in which individualism is problematic from a public health 
standpoint: A VHP decides not to vaccinate because they inappropriately assign a high 
risk to vaccines and they do not want their child to possibly develop autism. The non-
vaccinated child is somewhat protected by herd immunity.176 But, if too many individuals 
or VHPs make the same decision, then herd immunity is lost. Actually, these VHPs can 
form their own community, which makes things worse for the non-vaccinated children in 
that community.177 The children now have a much higher risk of contracting a vaccine-
preventable disease.  
In this scenario, all of the decision-making theories described above can get the 
VHPs to their decision. Ambiguity aversion is at play because the VHPs receive 
information that the vaccines work to protect against disease and that autism might be a 
consequence of the vaccine this is received as ambiguous information and the VHP 
inappropriately assigns risk.178 Affect is at play because the VHPs experience fear that 
their child will develop autism.179 Cultural cognition could be at play because the VHP 
places on the communitarianism-egalitarianism spectrum in the group-grid,  which has 
been shown to be adverse to new technology, and they assign a high risk to the 
technology.180 Finally, availability heuristics and dual process are at play because the VHP 
may be using their system 1 thinking; the VHP hears about the link between vaccines and 
autism and immediately concludes the risk is too high.181 System 2 is needed to fully 
evaluate the scientific consensus, but we know from Kahneman s work that is unlikely to 
happen.  
A similar scenario can be described with GMOs. The Honey Sweet plum is an 
excellent example (although it never made it to market). Scientists created a genetically 
engineered plum that is resistant to plum pox.182 Due to the regulatory process, the U.S. 
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government required that this plum include a pesticide label.183 From a scientific 
standpoint, this is completely absurd because the point of the honey sweet plum is to allow 
it to have internal resistance to plum pox, given that external attempts to control the spread 
of plum pox virus are not viable.184 The risk to human health from eating a honey sweet 
plum approaches zero.185 Thus, consumers should assign a low risk and high benefit
low risk because less external pesticide (against the aphids that carry the virus) and high 
benefit because it is a piece of fruit.186 Nevertheless, consumers are unlikely to purchase 
a honey sweet plum both due to the label of a pesticide and the inappropriate assignment 
of risk to genetically engineered food.187 This is an incorrect risk assessment because 
genetically engineered crops, such as the honey sweet plum, are likely more sustainable. 
Again, individualism is problematic, and all of the decision-making theories 
described herein may be at play for the consumer at the grocery store. Ambiguity aversion 
is at play because the consumer receives different information about the safety of 
genetically engineered foods, especially now that so many products are labeled GMO-
free.188 Why label it if it does not matter? This is what a typical consumer might think, 
thus the consumer assigns a high risk to genetically engineered food.189 Affect may be at 
play because the consumer fears the pesticide label on the honey sweet plum, for example. 
Who wants to eat a piece of fruit labeled as a pesticide? Cultural cognition may be at play 
because the consumer inappropriately assigns a high risk as part of their cultural 
association.190 Finally, the system 1 (fast thinking) can recall all of the anti-GMO 
advertising and assigns a high risk to anything related to GMOs. Individualism is 
problematic because society needs to come together to solve our food supply problems. 
The risk from GMOs in the marketplace is the same as any other food.  
These examples demonstrate that work needs to be done to recognize the rise of 
individualism and provide information in a way that allows them to appropriately assign 
risk. The rise of individualism does not negate any of the decision-making theories. 
Instead, it demonstrates how societal externalities impact the position in which people 
stand when they make decisions.  
Risk communication strategies need to recognize the rise of hyper-individualism in 
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order to provide information in a way that allows people to appropriately assign risk. The 
risk communication strategies described above are not necessarily sufficient. The rise of 
individualism may, in some cases, be in tension with risk communication. People may 
simply not believe the accurate information. This is discussed further in sub-section B 
below. 
B. Internet 
The amount of information and mis-information on the internet poses an enormous 
challenge. Actually, the depth of this issue is probably unknown.191 On the one hand, the 
internet and access to a wide breadth of information is a positive development. On the 
other hand, the availability of mis-information and a home for trolling  the unwary is 
problematic. If a person seeks to find information that supports their position, it is likely 
available somewhere on the internet. This creates an enormous challenge for people to 
easily and appropriately assign risk to various areas of biotechnology. 
If a parent is hesitant to vaccinate their child, they can find homage on the 
internet.192 So many people googled the link between autism and vaccines that Google 
actively changed its algorithm for this search so that the Center for Disease Control s 
(CDC) information came up first.193 The purpose for this change to the algorithm was to 
bring up the correct scientific information, i.e., no link exists. But, this only addresses the 
superficial problem. If a VHP wants to find support for their position, they can continue 
to search the internet for misinformation that supports their position.  
Once the mis-information is found on the internet, all of the decision-making 
theories described within this article support the VHP s assessment of risk. If a VHP 
searches the internet and finds information linking vaccines to autism, then the VHP may 
assign a high risk to the vaccine based on ambiguity aversion.194 Furthermore, a VHP may 
fear that they will actually harm their child with a vaccine, which suggests that affect is 
also at play.195 Cultural cognition theory can also work in a way that leads a VHP to 
inappropriately assign risk, depending on their group-grid position and the predicted 
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assessment of risk.196 Finally, the availability of misinformation on the internet can 
support the system 1 fast thinking in which a VHP will hesitate to vaccinate or not 
vaccinate at all.197 The VHP would need to employ system 2 to override the fast thinking. 
To complicate matters, it is unclear which, if any, of the decision-making processes is 
dominant at any given time. 
A similar scenario exists with food made from GMOs. In some ways, this is worse 
than the issue with vaccines because society has not felt the long-term benefits of this 
technology. An enormous amount of money (more on this below) is dedicated to the anti-
GMO movement.198 Internet searches about the safety of foods from GMOs brings up 
mis-information about the possibility of a link to disease, such as cancer.199 From a 
scientific assessment, the risk of foods from GMOs in the market place approaches zero.200 
This is so for a number of reasons, including that the number of mutations introduced 
through biotechnology are far less than those introduced through traditional techniques. 
No additional risk is created through the technology.201 
Not surprisingly, decision-making theories described herein explain why consumers 
resist foods from GMOs. If a consumer receives competing information on the internet 
about GMOs, then they will assign a high risk and low benefit pursuant to the theory of 
ambiguity aversion.202 If affect is the driving decision-making theory, then the fear of 
cancer or other potential diseases is sufficient for a consumer to assign a high risk.203 
Cultural cognition may also be at play if a person inappropriately assigns a high risk to 
technology, even if that technology can help alleviate climate change.204 Finally, the 
availability of mis-information about GMOs on the internet allows the system 1 fast 
thinking to quickly assign a high risk to buying foods that contain GMOs.205  
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The above is of course a cursory and summary assessment of how information from 
the internet impacts the way people make decisions. This is a conceptual discussion 
utilized to press the issue of how to allow people to appropriately assign risk in the face of 
an enormous body of information and misinformation. Empirical studies are needed to 
fully analyze the issue and, if possible, to determine how to counteract the applicability of 
mis-information in decision-making. 
C. Economics 
High dollar amounts are invested to provide false or misleading information to 
people.206 The anti-GMO movement, for example, is well funded. In Seeds of Science. 
Mark Lynas describes how he got swept up in the anti-GMO movement.207 In his book, 
Lynas describes how he spent years as an anti-GMO activist.208 It was not until he 
researched the science behind climate change that he realized the benefits of genetically 
engineered food for addressing malnutrition and sustainable agriculture. He had to grapple 
with his years as an anti-GMO activist and come to terms with the harms caused by 
Greenpeace and related organizations.209  
Many of the anti-GMO organizations are non-profit organizations, such as 
Greenpeace International, Friends of the Earth International, and the Center for Food 
Safety.210 Interestingly, these non-profit companies and/or nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) promote themselves as the non-profit seeking and consumer 
advocates fighting the big for-profit companies, such as Monsanto.211 In reality, these non-
profit and NGOs are well-funded and extremely effective at keeping GMOs out of the 
market place especially in areas that are in dire need of staple and stable crops, such as 
poor areas in African countries.212 Most of the funding for these non-profits/NGOs is from 
wealthy individuals in wealthy countries.213 
The organic industry, which now cannot be described as anything other than Big 
Agriculture, conducts strong anti-GMO campaigns.214 This is ironic given that the 
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technology might be highly beneficial for organic farmers.215 If, for example, an organic 
farmer seeks to have a higher yield of crop, then a pest-resistant GMO crop allows them 
to use less external pesticide and hopefully obtain a higher yield. But, for structural and 
ideological reasons, the larger organic industry opposes crops from GMOs and strongly 
campaigns against foods containing ingredients with GMOs.216 
The anti-GMO movements incorporate, even exploit, the ways that people make 
decisions such that consumers inappropriately assign a high risk to foods from GMOs. For 
ambiguity aversion, the anti-GMO movement portrays that foods from GMOs may be 
harmful or that we do not know enough about the crops to determine whether future harms 
exist.217 For affect, the anti-GMO movement uses fear fear of cancer and even fear of 
homosexuality to scare people into rejecting crops from GMOs.218 For cultural 
cognition, even group minded individuals might decide to reject GMOs as risky, either 
healthwise or from an environmental standpoint.219 For heuristics and dual process theory, 
the availability of anti-GMO rhetoric and the labeling of food as GMO-free exploits the 
system 1 thinking such that consumers easily recall an anti-GMO sentiment.220 System 2, 
much harder to engage, is needed to access the evidence-based safety of foods from 
GMOs. 
The anti-vax movement is supported by money, but it has a deeper explanation, 
which is a growing distrust of government and scientists.221 In some ways, this is 
understandable given mistakes made by governments about the mishandling of major 
health consequences from drugs made by pharmaceutical companies; Vioxx being a recent 
example.222 The anti-vaccine movement is able to exploit this. In addition, research in this 
area suggests that the rise of individualism is contributing to vaccine hesitancy.223 What 
is clear is that few, if any, current public health strategies are effective in the face of the 
increasing number of vaccine hesitant parents.224 
Again, our understanding from decision-making theories demonstrates how the anti-
vaccination movement is able to take hold. Money is spent by interest groups to promote 
mis-leading information about the safety of vaccines. Applying ambiguity aversion, 
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parents receive information about a link between vaccines and autism or they receive 
information about past harm from vaccines and they assign a high risk to vaccination.225 
Fear of an adverse consequence from vaccines demonstrates that affect is at play for 
VHPs.226 Even cultural cognition can explain how group-minded people can be against 
vaccination due to their assessment/perception of risk.227 Finally, heuristics and dual 
process theory help explain how the system 1 thinking in VHPs is at play because the 
VHPs receive information from the internet promoting an anti-vaccine sentiment.228 The 
VHP would need to employ system 2 thinking to assess the evidence-based assessment of 
risk regarding current vaccines and the greater risk from the vaccine preventable disease. 
D. Reconciliation and Transformation 
The issues discussed in this article are difficult to address. This article does not seek 
to upset or challenge any of the prevalent and evidence-based decision-making theories. 
Instead, this article shows how changes in society make it even harder for people to make 
decisions in which they appropriately assign risk. Current strategies to align consumer 
perceptions of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk are largely unsuccessful.229 
Providing correct facts to consumers (e.g., a doctor stating that vaccines are safe) is simply 
insufficient given the complexity of decision-making and the forces seeking to utilize how 
consumers make decisions to create the very chaos that this article seeks to address.230 
This article argues that the term transformation  can be utilized to achieve risk 
perception that is in line with evidence-based risk assessment. This term, transformation, 
is also used in David Brooks  book, The Second Mountain, but in that book, he uses the 
term as a way to find joy. This article takes a different bent on a similar concept, advocating 
that transformation is an umbrella term, describing how change is needed for consumers 
to accurately assign risk. As discussed above, additional research is needed to understand 
how to provide information in a way that allows consumers to appropriately assign risk. 
This needs to be done in a way that employs multiple decision-making theories and 
considers the variables of the rise of individualism, the role of internet, and the economics 
of forces seeking to create confusion and chaos. 
The problem addressed in this article is a tough one to solve. This article suggests 
that the answer lies in the decision-making theories. The anti-vaccination movement and 
the anti-GMO movement effectively use techniques that drive at the heart of these 
decision-making theories to obtain their desired results. One response is to use the 
decision-making theories to undo the anti-science sentiment this is controversial, to be 
sure. Simply providing fact sheets from the CDC about the safety of vaccines is completely 
insufficient.231 Instead, the information can be provided in a way that diminishes 
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ambiguity, captures emotion, acknowledges cultural cognition as risk perception, and 
allows consumers to easily and readily recall information that allows them to appropriately 
assign risk. 
Promoting evidence-based assessment of risk in a way that allows people to 
appropriately assign risk does have externalities. For example, as mentioned above, 
Google changed its algorithm such that searches for vaccines and autism brought up the 
CDC s fact sheets at the top of the search. Having Google change algorithms has major 
externalities in that it can be quite risky to have a private company control what 
information people receive.  
The issue is how to allow people to make decisions based on an appropriate 
assignment of risk even in the face of numerous variables seeking to persuade people to 
inappropriately assign risk. The solution, referred to as Transformation, must include a 
combination of decision-making theories, risk communication strategies that contemplate 
how people make decisions, and combatting the variables of hyper-individualism, internet, 
and economics as they impact assessment of risk. This is a lofty goal, to be sure. To be 
clear, allowing people to appropriately assign risk is distinct from their ultimate choice. In 
other words, a person may understand that foods from GMOs are as safe as conventional 
foods but still choose not to eat foods from GMOs for other reasons. The idea in this article 
is simply to align consumer perception of risk with evidence-based assessment of risk, but 
not to take away the autonomy of the final choice. 
This article seeks to recognize the complexity of current society and discuss how 
that complexity impacts decisions regarding risk assessment. In this way, this article raises 
the need for additional studies that address changes in society as a variable for risk 
communication and policy implementation methods. How does one, for example, allow a 
VHP to appropriately assign risk when the VHP is convinced that their online source of 
information is correct? Recent mandatory vaccination laws have increased the number of 
vaccinated children, so from a public health perspective, these laws work. But, it does not 
necessarily provide the VHP with the ability to appropriately assign risk. Mandatory 
compliance laws will not work with all areas of biotechnology. A state legislature will not, 
for example, require people to eat food from GMOs. Thus, the bigger question is how to 
allow people to appropriately assign risk in an increasingly complex society where people 
obtain information from various sources, not all of which are accurate. 
In his book, Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman recognizes the value of Cass 
Sunstein s work on nudges. According to Kahneman, nudges assist with the system 1 
decisions. For example, if employees are automatically enrolled in a retirement savings 
plan, then they are nudged into savings. The system 1, or quick thinking, is more likely to 
go along with the automatic enrollment. System 2 is needed to opt-out because the person 
would need to slow down and think about both short-term and long-term budgets. 
Conversely, an opt-in policy for retirement savings is less likely to accomplish the societal 
goal of saving for retirement. No nudge is created. System 1 may quickly reject an opt-in 
because it means that the person will receive less per paycheck. In sum, nudging is an 
effective way to overcome a system 1 process that may lead to an undesirable result.  
 
otherwise, the person will reject it. 
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But, it is unclear if nudging is sufficient or desirable to overcome the externalities 
of hyper-individualism and the internet, especially with respect to emerging technologies. 
Not enough people believe in climate change, for example. As Neil deGrasse Tyson 
famously stated: The good thing about science is that it s true whether or not you believe 
in it. 232 Climate change is real, whether one believes it or not. Changing our behaviors to 
address climate change is critical. Agriculture, one focus of this paper, is part of the 
solution. If people reject GMOs, for example, then our agriculture system will continue to 
be a major contributing source to climate change. While nudging can be used in some 
areas, it cannot save us from climate change. It is doubtful that even Cass Sunstein would 
argue with this assertion. 
This begs the question of how to allow people to appropriately assign risk to 
technology, such as GMOs, even in the face of non-evidence-based opposition. Simply 
providing the facts is insufficient to allow people to appropriately assign risk.233 If we 
want to allow people to appropriately assign risk as part of their decision-making, then we 
need to understand how the rise of individualism, the role of the internet, and the 
economics of keeping people from appropriately assigning risk interacts with decision-
making. Of course, allowing people to appropriately assign risk is a normative approach
but it seems the most honest approach. It does not require any particular decision; it simply 
allows the person to have an assessment of risk in line with evidence-based risk 
assessment.  
As previously indicated, this is a hard problem to solve. One suggestion is to utilize 
the decision-making theories to promote information to consumers in a way that exposes 
how the anti-vaxxers and anti-GMOers have used these decision-making theories to 
manipulate consumers. That is, show how the anti-movements use ambiguity, affect, 
cultural cognition, and prospect theory to advance their position. Expose these groups for 
what they are actually doing. This can be accomplished through the risk communication 
tools discussed in this article: nudging, risk hybrid, and public participation. 
The risk communication and perception strategies such as nudging, risk hybrid, and 
public participation in controversial areas can be effectively utilized to provide 
information in a way that exposes how some private interest groups are manipulating the 
consumers. The obvious opposition to the above suggestion is that it is manipulative. The 
argument is that the government or public health agencies should simply provide the facts 
in a neutral way and allow the consumer to decide. By utilizing the techniques of the anti-
vaccination movement or the anti-GMO movement, we are sinking down to their level and 
manipulating people into making decisions. This argument has merit, to be sure, because 
it is a form of manipulation. But, by not addressing how the opponents have gained so 
much momentum in a way that actually pushes back, the harms will continue. One way to 
address this argument is to be transparent. Actually, all of the risk communication 
strategies discussed in this article seek transparency.  
Empirical studies that include the variables described herein are needed to 
understand how to align consumer perception of risk with evidence-based assessment of 
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risk. Decision-making theories, risk communication, and external factors (individualism, 
internet, and economics) need to be combined in mega-study. This necessarily draws on 
important work accomplished by many cited within this article and seeks to move the ball 
forward incrementally, which is the scientific way. Grafted within this suggestion is the 
concept of communicating information in a way that complies with how people make 
decisions, as suggested by Daniel Kahan in his work on cultural cognition. 
The normative framework discussed in this article seeks to include changes in 
society and how we receive information as an integral variable in studies that seek to 
implement policies grounded in evidence-based assessment of risk. By building on 
important work in the social sciences, economics, and legal literature, this article moves 
the discussion forward. The concept is not to state that any decision-making theory or 
policy implementation tool is better than the other; rather, it is to use the important work 
done by others to test what is the most effective method given our modern-day 
circumstances.  
CONCLUSION 
Our society faces tough problems. Sustainable agriculture and advances in 
healthcare are major topics. The resistance to some of the emerging technologies in these 
areas warrants serious evaluation, which is what this article seeks to highlight. In numerous 
areas, consumers are assigning a high risk to technology even though experts assign an 
evidence-based assessment of low risk. 
This article describes several decision-making theories that help us to understand 
how people assign risk. In addition, different risk communication and policy 
implementation strategies are explored. By using two controversial examples, vaccines 
and GMOs, this article explains why consumers resist these technologies, along with the 
harms of such resistance. But, this article does not stop there. This article presses the 
conversation forward by highlighting how changes in society are important variables in 
understanding how consumers assign risk. The rise of hyper-individualism, information 
on the internet, and the economics of marketing are all important variables that require 
specific exploration to help us understand consumer perceptions of risk. 
The next phase of research needs to consider the changes in society to augment our 
understanding of decision-making and consumer perceptions of risk. Furthermore, these 
variables need to be considered in risk communication and policy implementation 
strategies. The world is changing and evolving. The problems are increasing. Societies 
need to collaborate and seek technological solutions to solve our most pressing problems. 
Policymakers need consumers to be in a position to appropriately assign risk in order to 
allow governments and citizens to work together to solve issues such as climate change 
and healthcare. 
 
